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Ruling
FCS057573 - PEREZ, HEIDI JUDITH VS BOOKER, WESLEY (DMS)
Jul 31, 2024 |FCS057573
FCS057573Motions for ContemptTENTATIVE RULING:Petitioner’s “motions” for contempt are denied.No affidavit of the facts constituting any contempt has been presented to thecourt. The filing of a sufficient affidavit is a jurisdictional prerequisite to acontempt proceeding. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1211(a); Koehler v. Superior Court(2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1169; Oil Workers Int’l Union v. Superior Court(1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 512, 541.) Page 1 of 1
Ruling
Maria Aguilar Barajas, et al. vs Eduardo Flores, et al.
Jul 31, 2024 |23CV-04351
23CV-04351 Maria Aguilar Barajas, et al. v. Eduardo Flores, et al.Order to Show Cause re: SanctionsAppearance required. Remote appearances are permitted. Parties who wish to appearremotely must contact the clerk of the court at (209) 725-4111 to arrange for a remoteappearance. Appear to address the reason Plaintiff failed to appear at the June 25, 2024,Case Management Conference and whether sanctions of $100 should be awarded. SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF MERCED Mandatory Settlement Conference Hon. Brian L. McCabe Courtroom 8 627 W. 21st Street, Merced Wednesday, July 31, 2024 9:00 a.m. The following tentative rulings shall become the ruling of the court unless a party gives notice of intention to appear as follows: 1. You must call (209) 725-4111 to notify the court of your intent to appear. 2. You must give notice to all other parties before 4:00 p.m. of your intent to appear. Per California Rules of Court, rule 3.1308(a)(1), failure to do both items 1 and 2 will result in no oral argument. Note: Notifying Court Call (the court’s telephonic appearance provider) of your intent to appear does not satisfy the requirement of notifying the court. IMPORTANT: Court Reporters will NOT be provided; parties wanting a hearing transcript must make their own arrangements.Case No. Title / Description
Ruling
A. E. B. VS HONEY MILESTONE, M.D, ET AL.
Aug 01, 2024 |24STCV07093
Case Number: 24STCV07093 Hearing Date: August 1, 2024 Dept: 72 SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT 72 TENTATIVE RULING A. E. B., Plaintiff, v. HONEY MILESTONE, M.D., et al., Defendants. Case No: 24STCV07093 Hearing Date: August 1, 2024 Calendar Number: 7 Defendants Honey Milestone, M.D. (Milestone) and Honey M.D., Inc. (Honey M.D.) (collectively, Defendants) demur to the Complaint filed by Plaintiff A. E. B. Defendants additionally move to strike portions of the Complaint relating to Plaintiffs requests for punitive damages and attorneys fees. The Court OVERRULES the demurrer to the fifth and seventh claims. The Court OVERRULES the demurrer to the second claim as moot. The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to Plaintiffs NIED claim with leave to amend for the purposes of moving Plaintiffs NIED allegations into her negligence claim. The Court SUSTAINS the demurrer to Plaintiffs remaining claims with leave to amend. The Court DENIES the motion to strike as to punitive damages. The Court GRANTS the motion to strike WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to attorneys fees. Background This is a health information privacy case. The following facts are taken from the allegations of the Complaint, which the Court accepts as true for the purposes of the demurrer. In September 2023, Plaintiff sought healthcare from Milestone, a licensed healthcare provider. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants failed to safeguard Plaintiffs personal health information and failed to take the appropriate security measures to ensure confidentiality of Plaintiffs personal information. Plaintiff posted a negative review online regarding Plaintiffs experience with Milestone. Plaintiff alleges that Milestone posted a publicly viewable response to the review which disclosed sensitive personal health information belonging to Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants response reads as follows: You came for an annual exam. Then wanted contraceptive counseling. Then you had a vagin*l infection and needed medication and counseling on the medication, its [sic] use and restrictions. Im sorry that you are leaving a poor review because you dont want to pay your copay. I hope you find a provider that is willing to see you for free. Good luck. (Complaint, Ex. A.) The name on Plaintiffs account where Plaintiff posted the review is redacted in Exhibit A. (Complaint, Ex. A.) Plaintiff filed this action on March 21, 2024, raising claims for (1) violation of California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, Civil Code, sections 56 et seq. (CMIA); (2) violation of Privacy/Data Breach Notice Statute, Civ. Code, sections 1798.82, et seq.; (3) common law invasion of privacy; (4) violation of California Constitution Art. 1, section 1 right to privacy; (5) breach of contract written and implied; (6) negligence and negligence per se; (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED); and (8) violation of Business & Professions Code, sections 17200, et seq. Defendants filed the demurrer and motion to strike on June 10, 2024. Plaintiff filed a single opposition to both motions together. Defendants filed a separate reply in support of each motion. Legal Standard Demurrer As a general matter, in a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) A demurrer tests the pleading alone, and not the evidence or facts alleged. (E-Fab, Inc. v. Accountants, Inc. Servs. (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.) The court assumes the truth of the complaints properly pleaded or implied factual allegations. (Ibid.) The only issue a demurrer is concerned with is whether the complaint, as it stands, states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Ibid.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, [i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend. (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245). Motion to Strike The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(a).) The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436(b).) The grounds for a motion to strike are that the pleading has irrelevant, false or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (Code Civ. Proc., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) Discussion Violation of California Confidentiality of Medical Information Act First Claim A provider of health care, health care service plan, or contractor shall not disclose medical information regarding a patient of the provider of health care or an enrollee or subscriber of a health care service plan without first obtaining an authorization, except as provided in subdivision (b) or (c). (Civ. Code, § 56.10, subd. (a).) Every provider of health care, health care service plan, pharmaceutical company, or contractor who creates, maintains, preserves, stores, abandons, destroys, or disposes of medical information shall do so in a manner that preserves the confidentiality of the information contained therein. Any provider of health care, health care service plan, pharmaceutical company, or contractor who negligently creates, maintains, preserves, stores, abandons, destroys, or disposes of medical information shall be subject to the remedies and penalties provided under subdivisions (b) and (c) of Section 56.36. (Civ. Code, § 56.101, subd. (a).) Medical information means any individually identifiable information, in electronic or physical form, in possession of or derived from a provider of health care, health care service plan, pharmaceutical company, or contractor regarding a patient's medical history, mental health application information, mental or physical condition, or treatment. Individually identifiable means that the medical information includes or contains any element of personal identifying information sufficient to allow identification of the individual, such as the patient's name, address, electronic mail address, telephone number, or social security number, or other information that, alone or in combination with other publicly available information, reveals the identity of the individual. (Civ. Code, § 56.05, subd. (i).) The text of Defendants alleged response does not contain Plaintiffs name or other personally identifiable information about Plaintiff. Plaintiff argues that at the time of the original review and Defendants response, Plaintiffs profile moniker was either Plaintiffs full name or a combination of Plaintiffs nickname coupled with her last name. Plaintiff does not allege this fact. However, amendment could cure this defect. The Court sustains the demurrer to this claim with leave to amend. Violation of Privacy/Data Breach Notice Statute Second Claim Plaintiff has agreed to withdraw this claim. (Opposition at p. 5:22-24.) The Court overrules the demurrer to this claim as moot. Common Law Invasion of Privacy Third Claim An actionable claim [for invasion of privacy] requires three essential elements: (1) the claimant must possess a legally protected privacy interest; (2) the claimants expectation of privacy must be objectively reasonable; and (3) the invasion of privacy complained of must be serious in both its nature and scope. (County of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles County Employee Relations Commission (2013) 56 Cal.4th 905, 926, citations omitted.) An otherwise actionable invasion of privacy may be legally justified if it substantively furthers one or more legitimate competing interests. Conversely, the invasion may be unjustified if the claimant can point to feasible and effective alternatives with a lesser impact on privacy interests. (Ibid., citation omitted.) Plaintiff incorporates her allegations from the rest of the Complaint and alleges that Defendant disclosed her personal health information. Plaintiffs invasion of privacy claim thus appears to be based on the alleged illegal disclosure of her medical information. Because Plaintiff has not alleged that the information disclosed was actually personally identifiable, as discussed above, this claim is similarly defective, but could be cured by amendment. The Court sustains the demurrer to this claim with leave to amend. Violation of Constitutional Right to Privacy Fourth Claim Plaintiff groups her response to the demurrer to this claim with her response regarding her third claim. For the same reasons as with the third claim, the Court sustains the demurrer to this claim with leave to amend. Breach of Contract Fifth Claim To state a cause of action for breach of contract, a plaintiff must be able to establish (1) the existence of the contract, (2) plaintiffs performance or excuse for nonperformance, (3) defendants breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 821.) If a breach of contract claim is based on alleged breach of a written contract, the terms must be set out verbatim in the body of the complaint or a copy of the written agreement must be attached and incorporated by reference. (Harris v. Rudin, Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) In some circ*mstances, a plaintiff may also plead the legal effect of the contract rather than its precise language. (Construction Protective Services, Inc. v. TIG Specialty Ins. Co. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 189, 198-199.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not pled the existence of a contract. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants patient intake documents contractually obligated Defendants to maintain the confidentiality of Plaintiffs personal health information. Plaintiff has therefore adequately pled the existence of a contract. Defendants make no other arguments supporting the demurrer to this claim. The Court therefore overrules the demurrer to this claim. Negligence and Negligence Per Se Sixth Claim In order to state a claim for negligence, a plaintiff must allege the elements of (1) the existence of a legal duty of care, (2) breach of that duty, and (3) proximate cause resulting in an injury. (McIntyre v. Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.) The negligence per se doctrine, as codified in Evidence Code section 669, creates a presumption of negligence if four elements are established: (1) the defendant violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity; (2) the violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property; (3) the death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature of which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and (4) the person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted. (Spates v. Dameron Hospital Association (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 208, 218, quotation marks omitted.) The doctrine of negligence per se is not a separate cause of action, but creates an evidentiary presumption that affects the standard of care in a cause of action for negligence. (Johnson v. Honeywell International Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 555, quotation marks and brackets omitted.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable injury for which she may recover. Because Plaintiffs injury is based in the disclosure of her personally identifiable medical information, the Court agrees insofar as Plaintiff has not pleaded facts showing that the information was personally identifiable. However, this defect could be cured by amendment. The Court sustains the demurrer to this claim with leave to amend. IIED and NIED Seventh Claim Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress The elements of a prima facie case for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiffs suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendants outrageous conduct. Conduct to be outrageous must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. (Wilson v. Hynek (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 999, 1009, citation and ellipses omitted.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not pleaded extreme and outrageous conduct. The Court disagrees. Regardless of the identifiability the information Defendants allegedly posted, publicly and unnecessarily discussing the sensitive nature of the treatment that Plaintiff sought in order to respond to a negative business review appears to be the type of extreme and outrageous behavior that the tort of IIED is meant to correct. Plaintiff has pled that she suffered severe emotional distress as a result. (Complaint ¶ 123.) The Court overrules the demurrer to this claim. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Plaintiff has stated that she is willing to move her NIED allegations into her negligence claim. For claritys sake, the Court analyzes the NIED claim here because that is where it was alleged in the Complaint. The Court sustains the demurrer to this claim with leave to amend for the purpose of moving the relevant allegations to Plaintiffs negligence claim. Unfair Competition Eighth Claim To set forth a claim for a violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 (UCL), Plaintiff must establish Defendant was engaged in an unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising and certain specific acts. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200.) A cause of action for unfair competition is not an all-purpose substitute for a tort or contract action. (Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration Products Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 163, 173.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not adequately stated a cognizable injury. However, as discussed above, California medical privacy law treats the disclosure of personally identifiable medical information as a cognizable injury. Defendants argue in their reply that Plaintiff fails to identify the statutes that were violated. First, this argument is new in the reply and therefore cannot be considered. Second, even if the Court did consider the argument, the Court would reject it on the merits because Plaintiff has identified the statutes that Defendants allegedly violated. Due to the pleading issues discussed above with Plaintiffs privacy claims, the Court sustains the demurrer to this claim with leave to amend. Motion to Strike Punitive Damages Punitive damages are appropriate when a defendant acted with malice, oppression, or fraud. (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) Malice is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) Oppression means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the persons rights. (Ibid.) Fraud is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Ibid.) In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff. (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.) In passing on the correctness of a ruling on a motion to strike, judges read allegations of a pleading subject to a motion to strike as a whole, all parts in their context, and assume their truth. (Ibid.) In ruling on a motion to strike, courts do not read allegations in isolation. (Ibid.) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not adequately alleged malice, oppression, or fraud. The Court disagrees. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants unnecessarily used sensitive information about the medical treatment Plaintiff sought in order to respond to Plaintiffs negative review. These alleged facts support allegations of intent to cause injury and of subjecting Plaintiff to a cruel and unjust hardship. Plaintiff has therefore adequately alleged malice or oppression. Defendants argue that punitive damages are improper in any action arising out of professional negligence of a healthcare provider. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.13.) This is not an action arising out of professional negligence. This is an action alleging intentional wrongful conduct. The Court denies the motion to strike Plaintiffs allegations related to punitive damages. The Court notes that a Plaintiff in a CMIA action may recover punitive damages up to $3,000.00. (Civ. Code, § 56.35.) However, because the Court sustains the demurrer to Plaintiffs CMIA claim with leave to amend, it is not a basis for the Courts ruling on the motion to strike. Attorneys Fees An award of attorneys fees is proper when authorized by contract, statute, or law. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1032, subd. (b), 1033.5, subd. (a)(10).) A plaintiff in a CMIA action may recover attorneys fees up to $1,000.00 and the costs of litigation. (Civ. Code, § 56.35.) However, because the Court sustains the demurrer to Plaintiffs CMIA claim with leave to amend, it is not a basis to deny the motion to strike. Upon motion, a court may award attorneys' fees to a successful party against one or more opposing parties in any action which has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest if: (a) a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large class of persons, (b) the necessity and financial burden of private enforcement, or of enforcement by one public entity against another public entity, are such as to make the award appropriate, and (c) such fees should not in the interest of justice be paid out of the recovery, if any. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.5.) Although the statute is phrased in permissive terms, a court's discretion to deny attorney's fees to a party that meets the statutory requirements of section 1021.5 is limited. (Carlsbad Police Officers Association v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 135, 145.) The current pleading provides little basis to believe that this action will confer a significant benefit to the general public. Defendants alleged response to Plaintiffs review appears to be a one-off event, and not a part of a systemic pattern of behavior. If the mere commission of a tort against one individual, without more, supported a finding of public benefit, then section 1021.5 would expand to cover the vast majority of tort actions. The Court does not find that this case falls within the public benefit rule. Plaintiff argues that the California Supreme Court has signaled that attorneys fees are generally appropriate when a plaintiffs action catalyzes a public benefit such as a voluntary change in the defendants behavior. (Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal. 4th 553, 56667.) However, as discussed above, this does not appear to be a case with such broad potential benefits. The same is true for Plaintiffs argument that cases vindicating constitutional rights support an award of fees the case law that Plaintiff cites indicates that the benefit must be one that flowed to the general public. (Press v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 311, 319 [citation and quotation marks omitted].) The Court grants the motion to strike. Because Plaintiff may be able to amend to state a CMIA claim or otherwise support the attorneys fees request, the Court grants leave to amend.
Ruling
Eads, Michelle vs. International Suites LLC et al
Aug 12, 2024 |S-CV-0051950
S-CV-0051950 Eads, Michelle vs. International Suites LLC et al** NOTE: telephonic appearances are strongly encouragedAppearance required. Complaint is not at issue - Need responsive pleading,default or dismissal as to Defendant(s): Intercontinental Hotels Group;International Suites LLC
Ruling
Sanchez vs. Kreger, et al.
Jul 29, 2024 |23CV-0203099
SANCHEZ VS. KREGER, ET AL.Case Number: 23CV-0203099This matter is on calendar for review regarding trial setting. The previous trial date was vacatedby the Court’s order dated May 8, 2024. The Court designates this matter as a Plan II case andintends to set the matter for trial no later than February 25, 2025. Defendant has posted jury feesbut Plaintiff has not. Plaintiff is granted 10 days leave to post jury fees. A failure to post jury feesin that time will be deemed a waiver of the right to a jury. The parties are ordered to appear toprovide the Court with available trial dates.
Ruling
Stutesman vs. Vang
Jul 29, 2024 |24CV-0204805
STUTESMAN VS. VANGCase Number: 24CV-0204805Tentative Ruling on Motion to Strike: Defendant Emmanual Vang moves to strike portions of Plaintiff KelceyStutesman’s Complaint filed on April 17, 2024. Plaintiff opposes the motion.Meet and Confer Requirements. Before filing a motion to strike a party is required to meet and confer in personor on the telephone. CCP § 435.5(a). A motion to strike shall be supported by a declaration stating either thatthe parties met and conferred or that they were unable to meet and confer. CCP § 435.5(a)(3). The Declarationof Timothy I. Mulcahey provides evidence of sufficient efforts to meet and confer.Motion to Strike Standard. A motion to strike can be used to attack the entire pleading, or any part thereof,including single words or phrases. Stearns Ranchos v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Railway (1981) 19 Cal. App.3d 24. It is proper for the Court to strike any irrelevant, false or improper matter. CCP § 436(a). The Court canalso strike any part of a pleading that is not drawn or filed in conformity with California law. CCP § 436(b).Merits. Defendant moves to strike “punitive damages” from ¶ 14(a)(2) of the Complaint and the entirety of theExemplary Damages Attachment. Recovery of punitive damages is codified in Civ. Code § 3294 which reads, inpart: (a) In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant. … (c) As used in this section, the following definitions shall apply: (1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.The facts asserted to support malice or oppression are included in the Exemplary Damages Attachment. The factsalleged include that Plaintiff was stopped at a red light, Defendant accelerated and rammed into Plaintiff’s vehicle,Defendant did not stop, and Defendant chose to flee the scene. Plaintiff further alleges that Plaintiff’s vehiclewas still drivable and Plaintiff gave chase until the Redding Police responded. Based on the damages, Defendantmust have been aware of the collision. Defendant’s acts are alleged to constitute a crime under Vehicle Codesection 20001 and Plaintiff asserts that Defendant’s acts were despicable. Plaintiff alleges punitive damagesunder both a malice and oppression theory.The facts alleged in the Complaint do not make it clear how severe the collision was, whether any damage toPlaintiff’s vehicle was visible, whether any injuries to Plaintiff were visible, or how far Defendant fled the sceneor in what manner. Many of the statements made are conclusions rather than statements of fact. Plaintiff did notallege that Defendant knew that Plaintiff was injured and the facts alleged are insufficient to support Defendant’sknowledge of injury. The allegation that fleeing the scene caused additional injury is also based on conclusionsrather than statements of fact. It is unclear how long medical treatment was delayed or how giving chase toDefendant affected Plaintiff’s injuries which are alleged to be “severe” without further detail.While it is certainly possible for a hit and run collision to result in a valid claim for punitive damages, the factsasserted here are so conclusory and vague that the Court cannot conclude that malice or oppression are properlyalleged. Without malice or oppression, punitive damages are not available to Plaintiff and the ExemplaryDamages Attachment would be unnecessary. “The law does not favor the imposition of punitive damages. Theyshould only be allowed in the ‘clearest of cases.’ Woolstrom v. Mailloux (1983) 141 Cal. App. 3d Supp 1, 9.Leave to Amend. Where there is a reasonable possibility that leave to amend can cure the defect noted in a motionto strike, Courts routinely grant such leave. It appears correcting the defects noted is possible here and the Courtwill grant Plaintiff leave to amend.The motion is GRANTED. Should Plaintiff intend to file a First Amended Complaint, the First AmendedComplaint must be filed and served within thirty days of today’s hearing. Should Plaintiff not file a FirstAmended Complaint, Defendant has ten days from the expiration of the time to file a First Amended Complaintto answer or otherwise plead to the Complaint. Defendant did not provide a proposed Order as required by LocalRule of Court 5.17(D). Defendant is to prepare the Order consistent with the Court’s ruling.****************************************************************************************** 9:00 a.m. – Review Hearings******************************************************************************************
Ruling
HUMANMADE, A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION VS. 150 HOOPER, INC., ET AL
Jul 31, 2024 |CGC23605908
Matter on the Law & Motion Calendar for Wednesday, July 31, 2024, Line 5, DEFENDANT 150 HOOPER, INC., A CALIFORNIA NONPROFIT CORPORATION'S DEMURRER TO AMENDED COMPLAINT. Transferred to be heard in department 501 on August 14, 2024. That department handles all lease cases per SF Local Rule 8.10A1. =(302/RBU)
Ruling
Lien vs. Ashby
Jul 30, 2024 |23CV-0203071
LIEN VS. ASHBYCase Number: 23CV-0203071This matter is on calendar for trial setting. The Court notes that the litigation is now at issue. The Court designatesthis matter as a Plan II case and intends on setting the matter for trial no later than February 19, 2025. Neitherparty has posted jury fees. The parties are granted 10 days leave to post jury fees. A failure to post jury fees inthat time will be deemed a waiver of the right to a jury. The parties are ordered to meet and confer prior to thehearing regarding proposed dates for trial. An appearance is necessary on today’s calendar.
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